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Abstract  
Nuclear power can play a role in reducing CO2 emissions and improving energy security. Public 
attitudes to nuclear safety governance will be critical in whether a large-scale rollout of nuclear power 
will be successful, so we commissioned a survey of 1,007 members of the British public to understand 
the determinants of such views. In particular, we focus on the role of trust in government, which has 
been largely neglected as a subject of study. We find that higher risk perceptions of new nuclear 
power technologies is associated with lower overall government trustworthiness, while higher 
engagement levels, being male and intentions to vote Conservative increase trustworthiness. Risk 
perceptions towards old and the new nuclear technologies do not differ significantly, which raises 
questions about the view that newer defence-in-depth nuclear technologies can reduce public fear of 
nuclear power. To build public trust, the UK government must demonstrate its trustworthiness in 
nuclear safety governance, especially along the dimensions of integrity, reliability and openness. 
Further, improving stakeholder engagement and thus increasing the levels of public satisfaction 
towards the government are necessary. Our novel research methodology of determining government 
trustworthiness in relation to public risk perceptions, technical knowledge, and stakeholder 
engagement is more broadly applicable and can be transferred to other subject areas and to countries 
where public concerns over nuclear safety and energy security are significant. 
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1. Introduction 
The UK relies on a diversified mix of generation technologies for energy security and has indicated 
its intent to develop new nuclear power technologies to satisfy the country’s demands for electricity 
(Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2011b). Nuclear is a low-carbon and mature energy 
technology and currently represents 20% of total electricity generation in the UK, although almost 
all of the current fleet of nuclear power technologies is set to retire over the next decade. The UK 
government has outlined its vision for successfully delivering a planned 16 GW of domestic new 
build by 2030, which would comprise 12 reactors over five sites (Department of Energy and Climate 
Change, 2013). In 2016, after some delays, the UK government led by Theresa May decided to 
proceed with the Hinkley Point C project, which would be the first new nuclear power plant to be 
built in the UK since Sizewell B in 1987.  China will take a one-third stake in the Hinkley C project 
– in the past few decades, China has developed ambitious nuclear programmes and recently began to 
produce its own nuclear plant designs. China aims to move up the export value chain and the recent 
agreement with the UK paves the way for the construction of Chinese designed nuclear reactors in 
the west (Gosden, 2016). The potential for a growing number of nuclear power technologies and the 
rising stake of China in the UK’s nuclear plans may create public concern on nuclear safety and 
security in the UK. 
1.1 Research Gaps 
Public opinion studies show that fears of nuclear accidents can persist over long periods (Bromet et 
al., 2011; Drottz-Sjöberg and Sjoberg, 1990; Visschers and Siegrist, 2013). Furthermore, perception 
and public acceptance can change following nuclear accidents (Huang et al., 2013). In some parts of 
the world, such as the Czech Republic and the United States, though the public is generally in support 
of nuclear power, they are uncomfortable if nuclear power facilities are to be built in their 
neighbourhood (Rosa, 2005; Frantál et al., 2016). Concerns regarding radioactivity are prevalent. In 
addition, they strongly believe that nuclear power facilities create wastes hazardous to human health, 
and damage the landscape (Kemp, 1990). 
Public confidence in the safety of nuclear power technologies is critical for policymakers as 
the expansion of nuclear energy often triggers anti-nuclear sentiments, resulting in public resistance 
against the construction of nuclear power technologies and project delays (Glaser, 2012). Building 
public trust in nuclear safety emergency governance (NSEG) presents significant challenges for 
policymakers. First, the lack of transparency of the nuclear industry and nuclear accidents has 
negatively influenced the public’s perceived trustworthiness of regulatory authorities (Greenberg and 
Truelove, 2010). Second, NSEG involves a complex mix of economic, social, environmental and 
governance concerns as well as a wide range of stakeholders, further complicating the building of 
public trust (OECD, 2010).  
Studies on nuclear technology have focused on public acceptance of nuclear power 
(Ansolabehere and Konisky, 2009; Corner et al., 2011; Diaz-Maurin and Kovacic, 2015; Gamson and 
Modigliani, 1989; Kasperson et al., 1980; Pidgeon et al., 2008; Rosa and Dunlap, 1994; Yuan et al., 
2017), public perception of nuclear risk (Huang et al., 2013; Mah et al., 2014a; Poortinga and Pidgeon, 
2003; Teräväinen et al., 2011), nuclear energy policy (Mu et al., 2015; Qvist and Brook, 2015), 
nuclear energy investment (Karaveli et al., 2015), nuclear safety (Gotcheva et al., 2016; Morrow et 
al., 2014; Mu et al., 2015), and public participation (He et al., 2013), rather than on what affects and 
predicts government trustworthiness and its dimensionalities. Nevertheless, the topic of government 
trustworthiness in NSEG deserves greater attention following the Fukushima crisis due to increased 
public fear about nuclear safety and distrust of government’s ability to tackle large-scale crises.  
1.2 Methodological Innovation and Policy Significance 
Our study aims to fill the current research gaps. Based on an ordinal logistic regression model, we 
aim to determine the variables that explain and predict overall government trustworthiness in NSEG 
in the UK. We have focussed on four different sets of independent variables, namely: (1) public risk 
perceptions towards old and new nuclear technologies; (2) knowledge about nuclear safety and power; 
(3) perceived level of public engagement in NSEG; and (4) demographics.  Public perception of 
overall government trustworthiness in NSEG in the UK is taken as the dependent variable. In addition, 
we have also examined attitudes with regard to seven dimensions of government trustworthiness, and 
performed principal component analysis (PCA) to identify the relative weights of these seven 
dimensions. 
Our study generates both methodological innovation and policy insightful results. First, our 
quantitative statistical study of perceived government trustworthiness in NSEG provides a systematic, 
quantifiable framework, to help readers understand how s, knowledge and perceived level of 
engagement, and demographics, will affect perceived government trustworthiness in NSEG, thus 
paving the way for the UK government to develop more meaningful and effective NSEG strategies 
that can build a trustful relationship between the UK government and its citizens. This is especially 
important during the time of Brexit, when the relationship between the public and the government is 
particularly politically sensitive and fragile.  
Second, deviating from previous studies of public opinion regarding nuclear energy, which 
investigated whether public trust, and other factors, such as public acceptance, knowledge, and level 
of engagement, will affect public perceptions of the risks associated with nuclear energy, our study 
aims to uncover, in reverse order, whether government trustworthiness in a nuclear emergency/risk 
governance setting as perceived by the public can be affected/predicted by public risk perceptions 
and others, such as knowledge, level of engagement and demographics. This will allow us to inform 
the corresponding government on how future policy-making should take into account the various 
important factors to improve government trustworthiness in NSEG in the future.  
Meanwhile, our trustworthiness model can be extended to other countries whenever effective 
nuclear emergency/risk governance that builds trust between citizens and its government, is needed. 
Our approach is particularly useful to countries which have deployed nuclear power technologies as 
well as those assessing the political feasibility of new deployment (Slovic, 1993), such as China, 
South Korea, India, Finland, Brazil etc. Besides, our logistic model of government trustworthiness 
can be extended to other projects with potential health and safety risk, where government 
trustworthiness are closely linked to public risk perceptions, the extent to which stakeholders are 
engaged, together with other key demographic factors such as gender, education, income, age and 
vote intention.   
Third, we have differentiated between perceived risks towards old and new nuclear power 
technologies, and the inclusion of both as separate variables in our ordinal logistic model of perceived 
government trustworthiness in NSEG in the UK. The differentiation makes it possible to understand 
whether the public risk perceptions towards old and new nuclear technologies in the UK are different, 
and how different they are. Our results showing that the new reactor models appear to be slightly 
more threatening than the old reactors provide an important insight that replacing old reactors with 
new ones would not reduce public fear towards nuclear, unlike the views hold by some physicists 
(Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform, 2008). 
Finally, the PCA of the relative weight of each dimension provides crucial insights into the most 
important influences on government trustworthiness. Knowledge of the importance of each 
dimension facilitates resources to be targeted economically for the purpose of enhancing government 
trustworthiness. The same PCA method above can also be used to evaluate risk perceptions towards 
nuclear power. Public risk perceptions can be deconstructed with the most important risk dimensions 
being identified and quantified.   
 
2. Theoretical rationale 
2.1 Trust and government trustworthiness 
Trust can be defined as a bet on the future contingent actions of others, based on one sociological 
notion (Sztompka, 1999). Hetherington (2005); Hetherington and Globetti (2002); Hetherington and 
Husser (2012) and Easton (1965) argue that it is significant for the government to secure its trust from 
the citizens and subsequently obtain the legitimacy to govern, given that the opposite of trust, distrust, 
will undermine its authority to govern, subsequently creating unwanted chaotic consequences. 
Pidgeon et al. (2007) highlights specifically the importance of trust for crisis management, an aspect 
particularly relevant to nuclear energy. In order to gain trust from the public, a government must act 
anticipatively or, in other words, be trustworthy (Dasgupta, 2000; Good, 2000). According to Hardin 
(1996), certain characteristics of government trustworthiness, such as commitment and credibility, 
are important elements to induce trust. Hence, it is justifiable to measure public trust in government 
through the lens of government trustworthiness. 
The increasing adoption of nuclear energy in the UK means that its citizens may be susceptible 
to an increasingly uncertain and uncontrollable future due to the risks associated with the new and 
the existing nuclear power technologies. Assessing the trustworthiness in NSEG is vital for building 
public trust and enhancing cooperation, thus establishing a mutually beneficial relationship between 
the public and the government in NSEG.  
2.2 The roles of risk perceptions, knowledge, stakeholder engagement and demographics 
2.2.1 Perceived risk of nuclear power technologies  
Nuclear risk perception is a subjective notion based on the characteristics and the severities of a 
nuclear accident (Slovic, 1987; Wildavsky and Dake, 1990). Heuristic and cognitive psychology 
hypothesizes that people use cognitive heuristics in processing information, which is the main cause 
of bias in assessing risks (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Yim and Vaganov, 2003). Based on this 
hypothesis, a psychometric paradigm has been constructed in such a way as to identify the 
determinants of risk perception (Fischhoff et al., 1978). The psychometric method has been utilized 
for studying risk perception in a number of countries, such as Norway (Teigen et al., 1988), Poland 
(Goszczynska et al., 1991), Italy (Savadori et al., 1998), France (Karpowicz‐Lazreg and Mullet, 
1993), and China (Lai and Tao, 2003). Even though crosscultural differences have been observed, the 
two-dimensional solution, consisting of both the threat dimension and the uncertainty dimension, was 
replicated in most studies. The psychometric paradigm can therefore be used to facilitate the 
assessment of public perception on nuclear risk in the UK. 
Based on the psychometric paradigm, risks can be broadly categorized into two categories: 
threat and uncertainty (Fischhoff et al., 1978). A threat risk generally elicits visceral feelings of terror, 
uncontrollability, catastrophe and inequality. An uncertainty risk is generally new and unknown to 
science. Research in psychometrics has proven that nuclear risk perception is highly dependent on 
intuition, imagination and experiential thinking (Langford, 2002). For example, factors which make 
nuclear accidents unusually memorable or imaginable, such as a recent disaster, heavy media 
coverage, a sensational and dramatic story or a vivid film, could heighten risk perception (Besley, 
2012). The recent Fukushima accident is a good case in point. Kim et al. (2013)’s survey across 42 
countries shows a sharp decrease in public acceptance after the accident. It also verifies that such 
decrease was more prominent in countries with a higher density of nuclear reactors. In Hong Kong, 
with the Daya Bay nuclear power plant located nearby, Mah et al. (2012)’s survey conducted two 
months after the Fukushima accident shows a high level of public resistance towards nuclear energy. 
Huang et al. (2013)’s research also shows that there was a significant shift in the public perception of 
Chinese towards nuclear energy after the Fukushima accident. The perception towards social and 
personal risks of nuclear accident shifted from moderate to serious after the accident. 
However, existing psychometric tests focusing on the risks of nuclear accidents do not 
differentiate between the risks of accidents from the old nuclear technologies and those from the new 
nuclear technologies.  Given the introduction of new nuclear technologies with defence-in-depth 
mechanisms including the newly designed reactor models imported from China by the government 
and the nuclear industry in the UK, it is possible that the public may perceive these new technologies 
as relatively safer than the old counterparts. Replacing old nuclear technologies with new ones may 
help reduce public anxieties and risk perceptions towards nuclear energy, and therefore improve 
government trustworthiness.  
Existing literature investigating the relationship between trustworthiness/trust and risk 
perception in different countries tends to predict perceived risks of nuclear energy based on 
trustworthiness of authorities, including the government. The surveys conducted by Mah et al. (2014a) 
on Hong Kong and Siegrist et al. (2014) on Switzerland suggest that trusts could reduce the perceived 
risks of nuclear technologies. However, these studies do not look at the reverse correlation, that is, 
how risk perception towards nuclear technologies can affect/predict government trustworthiness.   
Given an increasing number of new reactor models are to be developed across different 
countries, including the UK, distinguishing public risk perception between old and new nuclear 
technologies and how these two are related to government trustworthiness are important. The use of 
psychometric tests to uncover public risk perceptions towards old and new nuclear technologies, and 
the study of how public risk perceptions between old and new technologies can affect/predict 
government trustworthiness, can thus help the UK government understand how risky these new 
reactor models are perceived by the public, and assist the formulation of relevant policy strategies to 
improve government trustworthiness in NSEG in the future.  
2.2.2 Knowledge about nuclear and safety  
The relationship between knowledge and trustworthiness is not straightforward. The possession of 
knowledge about a risky event can work in an opposite direction to trust. Siegrist and Cvetkovich 
(2000) ascertain that people with less knowledge on a complex issue will tend to rely on social trust, 
or experts who are trustworthy and whose opinions can be believed as being accurate, when making 
judgements. However, their study examines the role of knowledge in mediating social trust and 
perceived risk, instead of exploring directly the relationship between knowledge and social trust. In 
addition, previous literature covering knowledge and trust is usually mediated by perceived risks. 
There are studies investigating the relationship between knowledge and perceived risk (Kuklinski et 
al., 1982; Nealey et al., 1978), and between trust and perceived risk (Biel and Dahlstrand, 1995; 
Flynn et al., 1992; Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2000). However, very little research has directly 
examined the role of knowledge in predicting trust in government. It is thus important to directly 
determine whether knowledge is a predictor of trust in the UK government’s NSEG.  
2.2.3 Stakeholder engagement  
Stakeholder engagement is the act of including stakeholders in the process of consideration, decision, 
and implementation of policy issues (Whitmarsh et al., 2005). The process creates a sense of 
ownership and belonging. In addition, engagement with community stakeholders increases trust and 
fosters an effective operating environment, reducing resistance and facilitating successful 
implementation of policy decisions (Bloomfield et al., 2001; Bradbury et al., 1999; Mah et al., 2014b). 
Arnstein (1969)’s ladder of participation, consisting of eight levels, is a well-established, 
reliable framework for evaluating the level of citizen engagement in government. Much of the 
literature examining the level of public engagement in the government’s decision-making/planning 
process remains qualitative (Lane, 2005; Luyet et al., 2012; Reed, 2008; Serrao-Neumann et al., 2014; 
Späth and Scolobig, 2017), while some other works assessing the citizens’ perceived level of 
engagement in government decision-making (Callahan, 2002; Tosun, 2005; Menzel et al., 2013; 
Reilly et al., 2016; Langer et al., 2017) are more quantitative, and have partially adopted/elaborated 
on Arnstein’s ladder of participation. 
The evaluation of the level of citizen engagement is important, since citizen engagement has 
an important role to play in government trust-building. Paterson (2004) argues that stakeholders 
should be involved in all stages of the decision-making process, though the government is still 
responsible for making the final decision. An effective stakeholder engagement process helps the 
government implement risk management policies more effectively. Failure to represent stakeholders’ 
viewpoints and build consensus could significantly weaken the legitimacy of risk management 
(Bradbury et al., 1999). In order to effectively manage stakeholder engagement with NSEG in the 
UK, it is necessary to study how stakeholders perceive their engagement activities, and how 
government should engage with stakeholders in order to maximize government trustworthiness in 
NSEG. 
2.2.4 Demographics 
Demographic characteristics can influence stakeholder perception and acceptance of nuclear power. 
Stakeholders’ attitudes, expectations and perception of nuclear risk may differ due to demographic 
variations (Rothman and Lichter, 1987). Demographics can affect one’s perspective of trust in 
government (Cook and Wall, 1980; Mah et al., 2014a; Meyer et al., 2013; Reiner and Liang, 2011; 
Wilkes, 2015). Important factors include age, gender, income, education, voting intention (for a 
political party), work type, marital status, and religion status (Lang, 2013). Statistical analysis can be 
applied to determine the significant predictors of UK government’s trustworthiness in NSEG. 
 
3. Data and methods 
3.1 Sampling and survey methods 
In order to determine the factors that predict UK government trustworthiness in NSEG, we conduct 
a survey covering four key dimensions: 1) perceived risk of nuclear power technologies, 2) 
knowledge about nuclear technology and safety, 3) stakeholder engagement and 4) demographics. A 
questionnaire was developed and an online survey was conducted in late April 2015 through YouGov, 
a leading opinion poll research company based in the UK. Respondents were selected from a pool of 
360,000 UK residents aged 18 or above, by representative sampling.  A pilot online survey was 
distributed to 200 respondents in early April 2015, followed by the full online survey with 1,007 
respondents in mid-April 2015.  The questionnaire covers five parts: 
A. Perceptions of the UK government’s trustworthiness in NSEG 
B. Perceptions of risks of death/harm associated with nuclear radioactivity 
C. Levels of engagement in the UK government’s NSEG 
D. Knowledge about nuclear technology and safety 
E. Demographics and attitudinal questions regarding phasing out or retaining nuclear power in the 
UK 
Part A – Stakeholder perceptions of the UK government trustworthiness in NSEG 
In the UK, responsibility for nuclear safety and emergency planning in the event of a nuclear accident 
is shared among the industry, local and national governmental agencies. In order to understand the 
level of public trust towards the UK government in NSEG, we sought their views on seven key 
dimensions of trust in the UK government’s past record of trustworthiness on public health, food, 
water and road safety governance. The seven key dimensions are: 
1. Openness – Does the government provide all relevant unclassified information to the public? 
2. Reliability – Does the government endeavour to keep its promises and commitments? 
3. Integrity – Does the government take actions consistent with its words? 
4. Credibility – Are governmental actions valid? 
5. Fairness – Is the government committed to impartial decision-making? 
6. Caring – Does the government listen to concerns raised by the public? 
7. Competence – Does the government have the necessary skills and expertise to carry out its 
duties? 
Part B – Public perception of risks of death/harm associated with nuclear power technologies 
We included a total of twelve questions in our survey to uncover the respondents’ risk perception with 
regards to nuclear power technologies. To create a sense of greater proximity, we invited our 
respondents to provide their risk perception responses based on the assumption that a new nuclear 
power plant is located at a distance of 5 miles away from their residence (although in reality very few 
British residents live within 100 miles of a nuclear power plant). Nine risk perception questions are 
modified from the psychometric paradigm, which aims to uncover the perception of technological 
risks including nuclear accidents (Fischhoff et al., 1978). Six questions relating to the threat 
dimension and three to the uncertainty dimension of the nuclear risk have been developed to uncover 
respondents’ risk perceptions towards both new and the old nuclear technologies:  
1. Voluntariness (Threat) – Do people enter the risky situation voluntarily?  
2. Immediacy of effect (Threat) – To what extent is the risk of death immediate?  
3. Control over risk (Threat) – To what extent can you avoid death while engaging in the activity, 
if you are exposed to the risk of each activity or technology? 
4. Chronic-catastrophic (Threat) – Is this the chronic risk that kills people one at a time or a 
catastrophic risk that kills large number of people all at once?  
5. Common-dread (Threat) – Is this the risk that people have learnt to live with and can think 
about reasonably calmly, or is it one that people have great dread instinctively?  
6. Severity of consequences (Threat) – How likely is it that the consequence will be fatal, if the 
risk from the activity is identified in the form of a mishap or illness?  
7. Knowledge about risk (Uncertainty) – To what extent is the risk known precisely by the people 
who are exposed to those risks?  
8. Knowledge about risk (Uncertainty) – To what extent is the risk known to science?  
9. Newness (Uncertainty) – Are these risks new and unfamiliar ones, or old and familiar ones?  
Part C – Existing levels of stakeholder engagement in the UK government’s NSEG 
Stakeholder engagement plays an important role on NSEG decision-making. It can boost stakeholder 
trust in NSEG (Mah et al., 2014a), or ameliorate stakeholder distrust, particularly when the risk of a 
nuclear accident is distributed unevenly (Löfstedt, 2005). To determine existing levels of engagement 
in the UK government’s NSEG, we deploy the ladder of engagement for measurement, which can be 
categorized into eight levels of stakeholder participation/empowerment, from the lowest level of 
engagement Level 1 (Manipulation), to the highest level of engagement,  Level 8 (Citizen Control) 
(Arnstein, 1969): 
1. Level 1, Manipulation – Stakeholders are not being engaged at all. The government and 
industry are solely responsible for the emergency plan 
2. Level 2, Therapy – Stakeholders are invited to sit in the emergency planning meetings but not 
allowed to share their personal views 
3. Level 3, Informing – Stakeholders are informed of the emergency plan only  
4. Level 4, Consultation – Stakeholders are able to sit in the emergency planning meetings and 
express their views but not have a right to vote on the final plan 
5. Level 5, Concession – Stakeholders are allowed to help develop emergency plans, but 
government officials reserve the right to veto their plans  
6. Level 6, Partnership – Stakeholders are being consulted and are invited to select from a few 
limited options  
7. Level 7, Delegated power – Stakeholders are given some of the power to plan for the 
emergency, alongside industry and government 
8. Level 8, Citizen control – Stakeholders are given the full power to plan for the emergency 
Part D – Knowledge of nuclear technology and safety 
Sound knowledge about nuclear technology and safety can help the public understand better the risks 
associated with nuclear power and prepare for emergencies. A government that provides adequate 
and relevant nuclear/risk information may reduce risk perceptions and boost public confidence/trust 
in the government’s NSEG (Mah et al., 2014b; Renn and Levine, 1991; Rogers et al., 2007; Siegrist 
et al., 2005). However, the relationship between knowledge and public trust in the authorities may 
not always be as straightforward as it seems. In some cases, in the absence of knowledge, perceived 
risks could be an important determinant of trust in nuclear experts by the public (Siegrist and 
Cvetkovich, 2000). To understand the level of knowledge of our respondents and how this will affect 
public trust in the government’s NSEG, we asked our respondents whether they are familiar with the 
specific knowledge of nuclear safety issues and the general knowledge of nuclear power. 
Part E – Demographics  
Similar to other social studies, where demographics can be influencing variables, our study will 
include demographic variables in our logistic regression model to determine if they could also be 
used to predict government trustworthiness in NSEG. Variables such as age, gender, education, 
income, voting intention, marital status, work type, and religion status, which might influence overall 
government trustworthiness on NSEG are treated as independent variables in our ordinal logistic 
regression model (refer to Table 1 for detailed definitions of individual demographic variables). 
3.2 Statistical models 
3.2.1 Principal component analysis (PCA) 
To understand what dimensions are affecting government trustworthiness, PCA is applied. The 
analytical approach utilizes a variance and covariance matrix of the dimensions to extract latent 
factors, calculate loadings and construct a weight vector to estimate the respondents’ perception on 
overall government trustworthiness (Nardo et al., 2005). We follow the procedures below to derive 
the weights of the different dimensions (Nardo et al., 2005): 
1. Latent factors representing seven key dimensions of overall government trustworthiness are 
identified. Each latent factor depends on a set of loadings and each loading measures the 
correlation between the individual dimension and the factor. The latent factors that preserve a 
significant amount of cumulative variance of the original data are retained to form an un-rotated 
factor matrix. In this study, factors that have eigenvalues larger than one are retained.  
2. The un-rotated factor matrix is transformed into a rotated factor matrix by varimax rotation to 
obtain a simpler structure: 
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where  
𝐹𝐿𝑖,𝑗 is the factor loading of dimension i on factor j, 
m is the total number of dimensions, and n is the total number of factors. 
3. A vector equal to the proportion of the explained variance is extracted from the rotated factor 
matrix: 
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where 𝑃𝑗  is the proportion of the explained variance, and j is the column number. 
4. Intermediate weights of seven dimensions are calculated from the rotated factor matrix 
corresponding to the factor loadings. An intermediate weight matrix can be formed: 
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where 𝐼𝑊𝑖𝑗 is the intermediate weight, i is the row number, and j is the column number. 
5. By multiplying the proportion vector (2) by the transpose of the intermediate weight matrix (4), 
a weight vector to estimate the UK respondents’ perception on overall government 
trustworthiness can be constructed: 






= [𝑊1 … 𝑊𝑚]      (6) 
where 𝑊𝑚 is the weight of key dimension m. 
In general, the larger the weight 𝑊𝑚, the greater the contribution of dimension m (m = 1 to 7) 
to the respondents’ perception on overall government trustworthiness. By identifying the weight of 
each dimension, one can predict how the same increase in the respondents’ agreement on such 
dimension will affect their perception on overall government trustworthiness. 
The PCA model capturing the relative weights of the seven dimensions used to estimate 
perception of overall government trustworthiness in NSEG for all respondents is: 
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Similarly, a PCA can also be applied to analyse the nine risk dimensions of old or new nuclear 
power technologies and how these nine key risk dimensions are related to each other. The larger the 
weight of dimension m (m = 1 to 9), the greater the dimension’s contribution to the respondents’ 
perception on overall risk of old and new nuclear power technologies. By identifying the relative 
weight of each of the nine dimensions, one can predict how the same increase in the respondents’ 
agreement on each dimension will affect their overall risk perceptions towards new or old nuclear 
technologies. The PCA model capturing the relative weights of the nine dimensions used to estimate 
overall risk perceptions of the new or the old nuclear power technologies in the UK for all respondents 
is: 
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By multiplying the weight vector with the average score of nine risk dimensions, a risk score 
vector to estimate the UK respondents’ risk perceptions can be constructed as: 
Risk score vector = [𝑊1𝑃1 … 𝑊9𝑃9]      (10) 
where W= [𝑊1 … 𝑊9] is the weight vector, and 𝑃𝑖 is the average value of the risk dimension i for 
all respondents (i =1…9). 
Threat and uncertainty factor scores of new and old nuclear technologies can be calculated as 
the sum of corresponding risk scores. 
3.2.2 Ordinal logistic regression 
We conduct a regression analysis to further assess the influence of four key sets of factors: i) risk 
perceptions of nuclear power technologies; ii) knowledge of nuclear technology and safety; iii) 
stakeholder engagement; and iv) demographics. Since the values presented by each respondent are 
categorical and ordered, an ordinal logistic regression model is chosen for statistical analysis (Lam et 




⁄ ] = 𝛼𝑗 − 𝛽1𝑋1 − ⋯− 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑛 + 𝜀                    (11) 
where 
𝑃𝑗𝑘  = Prob (𝑌𝑘 <= j), j = 1 or 2; 
𝑌𝑘 = response by respondent k; 𝑌𝑘 = 1 (“high trustworthiness”), or 2 (“undecided”); 
𝛼𝑗  is the y-intercept for j = 1 (“high trustworthiness”), or j = 2 (“undecided”); 
𝛽𝑖 is the slope of the selected variable 𝑋𝑖 (refer to Table 1 for variable specification); 
𝜀 is the random error with zero mean and finite variance. 
𝑃1𝑘 is the probability of respondent k taking the view that the UK government is highly trustworthy 
in NSEG. 𝑃2𝑘 is the probability of respondent k taking the view that the UK government is highly 
trustworthy in NSEG or undecided as to whether the UK government is trustworthy or not in NSEG. 
We use 𝑌𝑘 = 3 (“low trustworthiness”) as the reference category. 
From Equation (11),  
𝑃𝑗𝑘 = exp(𝐴𝑗𝑘) [1 + exp(𝐴𝑗𝑘)]⁄                    (12) 
where 𝐴𝑗𝑘 = 𝛼𝑗 − 𝛽1𝑋1 − ⋯− 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑛 + 𝜀  
Hence the probability of respondent k taking the view that the UK government is highly trustworthy 
in NSEG is: 
𝑃1𝑘 = exp(𝐴1𝑘) [1 + exp(𝐴1𝑘)]⁄                  (13) 
where 𝐴1𝑘 = 𝛼1 − 𝛽1𝑋1 − ⋯− 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑛 + 𝜀 
Factors that increase 𝐴1𝑘  also increase 𝑃1𝑘. Hence the interpretation of 𝑃1𝑘 is as follows:  
If  𝛽𝑖 > 0, an increase in variable 𝑋𝑖 will decrease 𝐴1𝑘, and 𝑃1𝑘, the probability of respondent k taking 
the view that the UK government is highly trustworthy.  
If 𝛽𝑖 < 0, an increase in variable 𝑋𝑖 will increase 𝐴1𝑘, and 𝑃1𝑘, the probability of respondent k taking 
the view that the UK government is highly trustworthy. 
The ordinal logistic regression model is constructed to reveal the relative importance of each 
of the four key sets of factors and to predict the likelihood of the UK government trustworthiness in 
NSEG based on a respondent k’s opinions and characteristics. Model selection is conducted in three 
stages. First, univariate analysis is undertaken to assess the potential strength of each independent 
variable (see Table 2). Next, we run a multivariate ordinal logistic regression model with the selected 
variables (representing the four key sets of factors) that carry a p-value less than 0.1 (see Table 3). 
Finally, we repeated the analysis by including only the statistically significant variables that carry a 
p-value less than 0.05 (see Table 4). 
 
4. Results and discussions 
We conducted a PCA with varimax rotation to determine the relative contribution of each dimension 
in predicting government trustworthiness (See Section 4.1) and the overall risk perceptions of new 
and old nuclear technologies (See Section 4.2).  We then conducted an ordinal logistic regression 
analysis to study the key factors that affected and predicted government trustworthiness in NSEG in 
the UK based on four different sets of factors: 1) risk perceptions of old and new nuclear technologies, 
2) knowledge of nuclear technology and safety, 3) stakeholder engagement and 4) demographics (See 
Section 4.3). 
4.1 Government trustworthiness on NSEG 
When asked whether the members of the public would consider the UK government as trustworthy 
in NSEG based on its past record of trustworthiness in public health, food, water and road safety 
governance, 24% agreed and 42% disagreed while 34% neither agreed nor disagreed (see Figure 1). 
Our results also indicated that more than half of respondents did not trust the UK government to 
effectively plan for the mitigation of a nuclear catastrophe. Over half (52%) of respondents indicated 
mistrust and only 28% indicated trust.  
 To obtain additional insights, a series of questions were designed to evaluate government 
trustworthiness along nine dimensions. According to our results, Component 1 had an eigenvalue 
exceeding one (3.99) and explained 56.94% of the total variance, and all seven key dimensions of 
trustworthiness were clustered on the same component (See Table 5 for the dimensions of government 
trustworthiness). This component was most heavily loaded for integrity, reliability and openness, 
which indicated that these three dimensions were relatively more important predictors of UK 
government’s trustworthiness in NSEG. On the other hand, fairness, competence, credibility and 
caring were relatively less important predictors (see Table 5).  With the use of PCA and varimax 
rotation, a weight vector was constructed to estimate the overall trustworthiness (see Section 3.2.1). 










































  (14) 
Based on the weights of the seven dimensions shown in Equation (14), the UK government can 
identify ways to increase its overall trustworthiness in NSEG by paying specific attention to the 
dimensions of higher weights, for instance, addressing the dimension of integrity, reliability and 
openness, which have accounted for 50% of the overall weight. If the costs and resources necessary 
to improve each dimension are similar, prioritizing the higher weighted dimensions can be more cost-
effective. However, it does not mean that other dimensions should be taken lightly. The difference in 
weights between the dimensions is significant though no single dimension is dominant and even the 
lowest dimension has a weight of greater than 10%. It is therefore worthwhile for the government to 
attend to all seven dimensions to improve trustworthiness, especially if there are diminishing returns 
to (or higher costs associated with) focusing on a particular dimension. 
4.2 Risk perceptions regarding old and new nuclear power technologies in the UK 
PCA was also applied to analyse the nine key risk perception dimensions of new and old nuclear 
technologies, as shown in Tables 6 and 7, respectively (see Table 6 for the risk component of new 
nuclear technologies and Table 7 for the risk component of old nuclear technologies). To provide a 
general picture of risk perceptions, PCA was performed and weighted vectors were constructed to 
estimate the loading of each risk characteristic for new and old nuclear technologies:  
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The values of the weighted vectors of risk perceptions for new and old nuclear technologies 
(Equations (15) and (16)) showed that none of the risk dimensions were dominant. The weight for 
each dimension ranged from 0.076 to 0.125 for new nuclear technologies, and from 0.077 to 0.129 
for old nuclear technologies. The difference in weights was less than 0.060 in both cases, indicating 
that the public generally viewed these risk dimensions as being of similar importance and that there 
was relatively little difference in their view of old and new nuclear technologies.  
We further analysed the perceived risk across the nine risk dimensions for both old and new 
nuclear technologies (see Figure 2). Comparing the two types of nuclear technologies, respondents 
perceived new nuclear technologies to be relatively more uncertain but less threatening compared to 
old nuclear technologies. However, the difference in perceived threat and perceived uncertainty 
appeared to be very small for these two types of nuclear technologies (see Table 8). Our result 
confirmed that replacing old with new nuclear technologies will not reduce public fear significantly. 
Any attempt to build public trust based on engineering measures alone will not suffice.   
4.3 Factors explaining the UK government’s trustworthiness in NSEG 
We studied the key factors that may affect and predict government trustworthiness in NSEG based 
on four different sets of variables: 1) risk perception towards nuclear technologies, 2) knowledge of 
nuclear energy and safety, 3) existing level of stakeholder engagement and 4) demographics, using 
an ordinal logistic regression model (see Section 3.2.2).  
The results of our main ordinal logistic regression models were tabulated in Tables 2 - 4. 
Overall, our analysis, presented in descending order of the value of β, showed that being male, 
intention to vote for the Conservative party, overall risk perceptions towards the new nuclear 
technologies, and existing engagement level were significant predictors (which constitute the main 
independent variables) of overall government trustworthiness in NSEG (the dependent variable).  
Definitions for dependent and independent variables of the logistic regression were listed in Table 1. 
In terms of the odds ratio which measures the strength of the association between the independent 
variable and the dependent variable, the value of the highest impact factor (voting intention for the 
Conservative Party) and the lowest impact factor (overall risk perceptions towards new nuclear 
technologies) could be up to a factor of 10 (see Table 4). In fact, the odds of being high trustworthiness 
in NSEG in groups with the intentions to vote for the Conservative Party is about 7 times higher than 
that of the intentions to vote for the Labour Party, while for one unit increase in overall risk 
perceptions towards the new nuclear technologies, the odds of being high trustworthiness in NSEG 
will decrease by 33% on average. 
4.3.1 Demographics factors: gender and voting intention  
During the survey, demographic information including gender, age, income, education, voting 
intention, marital status, work type and religion status were gathered. Our regression analysis showed 
that among all demographic factors, being male and intention to vote Conservative were associated 
with increase in overall government trustworthiness, with the latter having the most significant 
influence.  
4.3.2 Risk perceptions towards new and old nuclear power technologies 
British respondents held different risk perceptions towards new and old nuclear technologies. When 
the respondents were asked how they would assess the risk of death/harm associated with nuclear 
radiation released from new nuclear technologies, 40% perceived a high risk and 40% perceived a 
low risk, whereas for old nuclear technologies, the ratio of high risk to low risk was 56% to 24%, 
while 20% were undecided for both categories. 
Overall risk perception was a significant predictor of overall government trustworthiness in 
NSEG only for new nuclear technologies. Based on the direction and magnitude of parameter 
estimates, increase in risk perception would decrease overall government trustworthiness in NSEG. 
Moreover, the magnitude of parameter estimate for new nuclear technologies was much larger than 
old nuclear technologies. From our results, it could be concluded that the public’s overall perceived 
risks of new and old nuclear technologies were generally correlated negatively with the UK 
government’s trustworthiness in NSEG, and the impacts of perceived risks towards the new nuclear 
technologies are more significant. The results were consistent with previous findings in the literature 
that risk perception was generally linked negatively to trustworthiness (Mah et al., 2014a; Schmidt, 
2004).  
4.3.3 Existing level of engagement 
Our respondents were asked to assess: 1) their existing level of engagement in NSEG based on their 
general conception of how they are currently being engaged in the UK government’s environmental 
planning; 2) their levels of satisfaction at their rated level of engagement, based on their perception 
of the UK government’s previous record on public health, food, water and road safety emergency 
planning (Table 9). We divided stakeholder engagement into eight levels, ranging from manipulation 
to citizen control, which were structured along the ladder of public participation (Arnstein, 1969). 
The higher the level, the more intensive the participation and power influence in decision-making 
(see Section 3.1 for details). The majority (57%) of respondents believed that the current level of 
stakeholder engagement was Level 2 (Therapy), and only 11% of such respondents were satisfied 
with this level of engagement. About 12% of respondents believed that they would want to be engaged 
at Level 6 (Partnership), and only 30% were satisfied with being engaged at this level. The results 
suggested that the existing engagement level was perceived to be low. One reason could be that most 
of the respondents did not live in the vicinity of the sites of nuclear power technologies and existing 
engagement was generally targeted at emergency planning areas around such sites. Nonetheless, 
except for Levels 1 (Manipulation) and 5 (Concession), the results showed a general trend that the 
higher the engagement level, the higher the satisfaction level. Citizens may find Level 5 less 
satisfactory, given that the veto right of the government could negate their time and efforts.  
4.3.4 Variables not affecting and predicting government trustworthiness 
Contrary to existing literature and the general belief that more knowledge about nuclear technology 
could reduce public fears and increase confidence, our study found that knowledge was an 
insignificant predictor of public trust in NSEG (p > 0.05, see Table 3). This implied that there is no 
straightforward ‘deficit’ model operating (Sturgis and Allum, 2004), and strategies that spoon-feed 
the public with information would not increase government trustworthiness in NSEG in the UK. Our 
ordinal logistic analyses also found that age, education, marital status, work type and religion status 
(p > 0.1, see Table 2), and income (p > 0.05, see Table 3), were insignificant factors and predictors of 
overall government trustworthiness.  
4.3.5 Significant Factors for Predicting Government Trustworthiness in NSEG 
Based on the selected ordinal logistic regression model with only significant variables (see Section 
3.2.2), the formula for predicting the probability of high government trustworthiness of NSEG in the 
UK was as follows:  
𝑃(High Trustworthiness) = exp(𝐴) [1 + exp(𝐴)]⁄    (17) 
where 
𝐴 = −2.264 − 0.262 ×  Overall Risk Perceptions towards New Nuclear Technologies +
0.183 × Existing Engagement Level + 0.536 × Gender (Male) + 2.082 ×
Voting Intention (Conservative Party). 
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
We have investigated the factors that affect and predict overall government trustworthiness in NSEG 
in the UK, by examining risk perceptions towards old and new nuclear technologies, knowledge about 
nuclear safety, stakeholder engagement and demographics.  We have developed an econometric 
model to study the relationships and ascertain the probability of government trustworthiness for given 
levels of risk perception, knowledge about nuclear safety, stakeholder engagement as well as 
demographic factors. 
To achieve the UK Climate Change Act target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80% 
compared with 1990 levels in an economically efficient manner, the UK government has recognized 
the importance of having “nuclear, renewables and carbon capture and storage technologies 
competing with each other to deliver energy at the lowest possible cost” (Department of Energy and 
Climate Change, 2011a).  The number of new nuclear power technologies is projected to increase. 
With the approval of Hinkley Point C project in which Chinese influence is prominent, public 
concerns about nuclear NSEG may rise, particularly if several other sites are also developed. Our 
study has revealed that the risk perceptions towards new nuclear technologies would negatively 
impact the trustworthiness of the government in nuclear emergency governance. Such risk perception 
could be further reinforced as China is expected to take a greater role in nuclear development in the 
UK, with China’s determination to export more nuclear technologies to the world (World Nuclear 
Association, 2018).  
Among the seven key dimensions of trustworthiness, our analysis has shown that integrity, 
reliability and openness are particularly relevant to the UK government’s overall trustworthiness in 
NSEG. Hence, the UK government should devote resources towards upholding the integrity, 
reliability and transparency of the process to improve public trust in NSEG. One way to address these 
aspects may be through better and greater stakeholder engagement.  
Mapping the dimensions of integrity, reliability and openness onto the various levels of 
stakeholder engagement, we see that except for the lowest level (Manipulation), all other levels would 
require the government to exhibit qualities of integrity, reliability and openness. Beyond the half of 
the respondents who are satisfied with the Manipulation level, we have found that, in general, the 
higher the perceived level of engagement, the higher the satisfaction with the UK government. An 
interesting exception happens at the level of Concession, where stakeholders are allowed to develop 
plans that can be vetoed by the government. Such a veto mechanism will lead to public suspicion of 
the government’s integrity and reliability, and therefore reduce overall public satisfaction and 
perceived trustworthiness of the government.  
Devoting more effort into stakeholder engagement may not have significant impacts on the 
administrative costs of the government. The comparison between the satisfaction expressed over the 
Therapy and Consultation levels revealed that if the public are invited to emergency planning 
meetings, simply allowing them the opportunity to speak would significantly increase the number of 
satisfied participants, even when they do not have any voting rights on the final emergency plan. 
Since more than half of the respondents believe they have been given the opportunity to attend 
planning meetings, acknowledging their participation and giving them the opportunity to speak can 
be easily achieved without much additional cost.  
An important insight gained from our survey is that while overall risk perceptions is an 
important predictor of overall government trustworthiness on NSEG, it is statistically significant only 
for new nuclear technologies. The higher the public’s overall perceived risk associated with new 
nuclear technologies, the lower the overall perception of government trustworthiness on NSEG. 
Contrary to some nuclear experts who assert that newer nuclear models with ‘defence-in-depth’ 
mechanisms would provide greater safety assurance to the public (Department for Business, 
Enterprise & Regulatory Reform, 2008), our results confirm that such a “newer means safer” 
mentality is not held by the British public. Uncertainties and threats associated with new nuclear 
models clearly have instilled some degree of public fear and distrust. As such, any future approval 
plans for new nuclear technologies by the UK government or any other plans to build new models by 
industry may provoke public fears and greater scrutiny.  In order to reduce this, it is critical for the 
UK government to portray an image of an integral, reliable and open government while explaining 
to the public how NSEG and other safety procedures and considerations regarding the construction, 
operation and decommissioning of new nuclear reactors in the UK, will be attended to carefully, to 
avoid any potential serious nuclear accidents associated with the new reactor models from occurring 
in the UK in future. 
Our study has also shown that males intending to vote for the Conservative Party are more 
likely to perceive the government as trustworthy. Future studies may wish to explore the 
psychological theories behind such correlation and tailor strategies specifically towards female and/or 
non-Conservative Party voters to improve the effectiveness of current measures. Of course, at the 
time of our survey in 2015, the Conservatives were leading the government, so it could well be that 
if there were to be a future Labour government, then Labour voters might then be more trusting in 
government on NSEG (and other issues). Our study also confirms that knowledge is an insignificant 
predictor of public trust in NSEG. This implies that strategies that spoon-feed the public with more 
information would not increase government trust on NSEG.   
Our analytical approach is applicable both to countries that already have extensive nuclear 
power technologies as well as those contemplating significant new deployments, such as China. The 
survey questions can be easily modified to suit the conditions of a particular country. Our logistic 
regression model of government trustworthiness can also be extended to other projects with potential 
health and safety risks such as other large energy or infrastructure projects, where government 
trustworthiness is closely linked to public risk perceptions, stakeholder engagement, and other key 
demographic factors such as gender and voting intention.    
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 Table 1. Definition of dependent and independent variables used in the ordinal logistic regression 
model 
Dependent Variable Definition 
Trustworthiness 
Respondent’s view on the UK government’s trustworthiness in 
NSEG; on the scale of 1 if “high trustworthiness” to 3 if “low 
trustworthiness” 
Independent Variables Definition 
Overall risk perceptions (New 
nuclear power technologies) 
Overall nuclear radiation risk perceptions of respondents towards 
new nuclear power technologies; on the scale of 1 (“low risk”) to 
5 (“high risk”) 
Overall risk perceptions (Old 
nuclear power technologies) 
Overall nuclear radiation risk perceptions of respondents towards 
old nuclear power technologies; on the scale of 1 (“low risk”) to 
5 (“high risk”) 
Knowledge of nuclear power/safety 
Total scores of specific knowledge of nuclear power/safety; on 
the scale of 0 (“score 0”) to 4 (“score 4”) 
Existing engagement level 
Existing engagement level of nuclear power/safety; on the scale 
of 1 if “Level 1” to 8 if “Level 8” 
Gender Gender of respondent; 1 if “male” and 0 if “female”  
Age Age of respondent; on the scale of “<20” to “>60”  
Income 
Yearly income of respondent; on the scale of “<£5,000” to 
“>£100,000”  
Education 
Education level of respondent; 0 if “non-degree or below” and 1 
if “degree or above” 
Voting intention 
Voting intention of respondent; on the category of 1 if 
“Conservative Party”, 2 if “Labour Party”, 3 if “Liberal 
Democrats”, 4 if “Other parties”, 5 if “Don’t know” 
Marital status 
Marital status of respondent; on the category of 1 if “Married”, 2 
if “Living as married”, 3 if “Separated”, 4 if “Divorced”, 5 if 
“Widowed”, 6 if “Never married”, 7 if “Civil partnership” 
Work type 
Work type of respondent; on the category of 1 if “Professional or 
higher technical work”, 2 if “Manager or Senior Administrator”, 
3 if “Clerical”, 4 if “Sales or Services”, 5 if “Foreman or 
Supervisor of Other Workers”, 6 if “Skilled Manual Work”, 7 if 
“Semi-Skilled or Unskilled Manual Work”, 8 if “Other”, 9 if 
“Have never worked” 
Religion status 
Religion status of respondent; on the category of 1 if “Yes”, 2 if 
“No”, 3 if “Don’t know”, 4 if “Prefer not to say” 
 
Table 2. Univariate ordinal logistic regression that explains/predicts the UK government 
trustworthiness in NSEG1  
Independent Variables β-value p-value  
Overall risk perception (New nuclear power 
technologies) 
0.327 0.000 
Overall risk perception (Old nuclear power 
technologies) 
0.354 0.000 
Knowledge of nuclear power/safety -0.108 0.064 
Existing engagement level -0.214 0.000 
Gender [male]2 -0.440 0.000 
Age -0.048 0.267 
Income -0.271 0.000 
Education [non-degree or below]3 0.043 0.720 
Voting intention [Conservative Party]4 -2.082 0.000 
Voting intention [Liberal Democrats] 4 -0.614 0.027 
Voting intention [Other parties]4 0.374 0.048 
Voting intention [Don’t know] 4 -0.304 0.129 
Marital status [Married]5 -0.458 0.498 
Marital status [Living as married]5 -0.235 0.736 
Marital status [Separated]5 -0.369 0.645 
Marital status [Divorced]5 0.046 0.947 
Marital status [Widowed]5 -0.574 0.436 
Marital status [Never married]5 -0.220 0.748 
Work type [Professional or higher technical work]6 -0.214 0.658 
Work type [Manager or Senior Administrator]6 -0.751 0.126 
Work type [Clerical]6 -0.140 0.773 
Work type [Sales or Services]6 0.308 0.548 
Work type [Foreman or Supervisor of Other Workers]6 -0.414 0.495 
Work type [Skilled Manual Work]6 0.311 0.554 
Work type [Semi-Skilled or Unskilled Manual Work]6 -0.097 0.847 
Work type [Other]6 -0.177 0.724 
Religion status [Yes]7 -0.156 0.813 
Religion status [No]7 0.199 0.763 
Religion status [Prefer not to say]7 0.164 0.859 
Remarks: 
1. Reference category for dependent variable: “low trustworthiness” 
2. Reference category for gender: “female” 
3. Reference category for education: “degree or above” 
4. Reference category for voting intention: “Labour Party” 
5. Reference category for marital status: “Civil partnership” 
6. Reference category for work type: “Have never worked” 
7. Reference category for religion status: “Don’t know” 
 
Table 3. Ordinal logistic regression that explains/predicts the UK government trustworthiness in 
NSEG5 
Variables (Coefficients)  
Total number of opinions 385 
Number of 1 (“high trustworthiness”) opinions 102 
Number of 2 (“undecided trustworthiness”) opinions 105 
Number of 3 (“low trustworthiness”) opinions 178 
McFadden pseudo R2 0.174 
Intercept for response = 1 (“high trustworthiness”): α1 -2.347*** 
Intercept for response = 1 (“high trustworthiness”) or response = 2 
(“undecided trustworthiness”): α2 
-0.730 
X1 Overall risk perceptions on old nuclear technologies: β1 0.035 
X2 Overall risk perceptions on new nuclear technologies: β2 0.246* 
X3 Existing engagement level: β3 -0.209*** 
X4 Knowledge: β4 0.051 
X5 Income: β5 -0.089 
X6 = 1 if Gender = “male” else 0: β6 -0.598* 
X7 = 1 if Voting intention = “Conservative Party” else 0: β7 -2.019*** 
X8 = 1 if Voting intention = “Liberal Democrats” else 0: β8 -0.317 
X9 = 1 if Voting intention = “Other parties” else 0: β9 0.171 
Remarks: 
1. Reference category for dependent variable: “low trustworthiness” 
2. Reference category for gender: “female” 
3. Reference category for voting intention: “Labour Party” 
4. *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001 
5. All dependent variables that predict overall government trustworthiness via univariate analysis with p-value < 0.1 
(See Table 2) 
 
Table 4. Ordinal logistic regression that explains/predicts the UK government trustworthiness in 
NSEG5 
Variables (Coefficients)  
Total number of opinions 475 
Number of 1 (“high trustworthiness”) opinions 116 
Number of 2 (“undecided trustworthiness”) opinions 137 
Number of 3 (“low trustworthiness”) opinions 222 
McFadden pseudo R2 0.171 
Intercept for response = 1 (“high trustworthiness”): α1 -2.264*** 
Intercept for response = 1 (“high trustworthiness”) or response = 2 
(“undecided trustworthiness”): α2 
-0.531 
X1 Overall risk perceptions on new nuclear technologies: β1 0.262*** 
X2 Existing engagement level: β2 -0.183*** 
X3 = 1 if Gender = “male” else 0: β3 -0.536** 
X4 = 1 if Voting intention = “Conservative Party” else 0: β4 -2.082*** 
Remarks: 
1. Reference category for dependent variable: “low trustworthiness” 
2. Reference category for Gender: “female” 
3. Reference category for Voting intention: “Labour Party” 
4. *p-value < 0.05, **p-value < 0.01, ***p-value < 0.001 
5. All dependent variables that predict overall government trustworthiness via multivariate ordinal logistic 
regression with p-value < 0.05 (See Table 3) 
 
Table 5. Principal component analysis of seven dimensions of the UK government trustworthiness 
in NSEG 
Key Dimensions Survey Questions Mean Component 1 
Integrity 
Does the government take actions consistent with its 
words? 
2.53 0.847 
Reliability  Does the government try hard to keep its promises? 2.76 0.819 
Openness 








Does the government have the necessary skills and 
competence to carry out its duties? 




Does the government ignore the views of scientists 
who disagree with it? 




Does the government listen to the concerns raised by 
people like you? 
2.41 0.665 
Total variance explained 
Initial eigenvalue  






Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin KMO and Bartlett's Test 
KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy: 0.878 
Approximate Chi-Square: 3215.256 




Table 6. Principal component analysis of nine dimensions of nuclear radiation risks from new nuclear 
technologies 









Do you think that the risk will kill/harm a 
small number of people gradually over time 
or a large number of people all at once?  
(1=chronic, 5=catastrophic) 
0.736 0.095 0.278 
Immediacy of 
effect 
Whether you think the risk of death/harm 
would be immediate or would it happen over 
a long period of time? 
(1=delayed, 5=immediate) 
0.728 -0.092 -0.137 
Common-dread 
Is the risk associated a common one that you 
do not worry about much or one that you 
dread? 
(1=common, 5=dread) 
0.691 0.308 0.221 
Voluntariness 
Whether you think the risk has been 
imposed on you or whether you think you 
have had any say over the risk? 
(1=voluntary, 5=involuntary) 
-0.007 0.768 0.013 
Control over risk 
Do you think you would be able to avoid the 
risk of death/harm through your own skills 
or expertise? 
(1=controllable, 5=uncontrollable) 
0.014 0.698 0.351 
Severity of 
consequences 
Do you think it would end up being fatal or 
it would end up not being fatal if someone 
was exposed to the risk? 
(1=certain not to be fatal, 5=certain to be 
fatal) 
0.416 0.615 -0.013 
Newness 
Do you think it to be a new risk to you or a 
risk that has each been around for a long 
time? 
(1=old, 5=new) 




How would you rate your knowledge of the 
risk? 
(1=known precisely, 5=not known precisely) 




How would you rate scientists’ knowledge 
of the risk? 
(1=known precisely, 5=not known precisely) 
0.146 0.085 0.593 
Total variance explained 
Initial eigenvalue  














Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin KMO and Bartlett's Test 
KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy: 0.734 
Approximate Chi-Square: 393.307 




Table 7. Principal component analysis of nine dimensions of nuclear radiation risks from 50-year 
old nuclear technologies 







Control over risk 
Do you think you would be able to avoid 
the risk of death/harm through your own 
skills or expertise? 
(1=controllable, 5=uncontrollable) 
0.730 0.021 0.226 
Severity of 
consequences 
Do you think it would end up being fatal 
or it would end up not being fatal if 
someone was exposed to the risk? 
(1=certain not to be fatal, 5=certain to be 
fatal) 
0.670 0.392 -0.033 
Voluntariness 
Whether you think the risk has been 
imposed on you or whether you think you 
have had any say over the risk? 
(1=voluntary, 5=involuntary) 
0.616 -0.001 -0.041 
Immediacy of 
effect 
Whether you think the risk of death/harm 
would be immediate or would it happen 
over a long period of time? 
(1=delayed, 5=immediate) 
-0.169 0.727 -0.097 
Chronic-
catastrophic 
Do you think that the risk will kill/harm a 
small number of people gradually over 
time or a large number of people all at 
once?  
(1=chronic, 5=catastrophic) 
0.187 0.706 0.203 
Common-dread 
Is the risk associated a common one that 
you do not worry about much or one that 
you dread? 
(1=common, 5=dread) 
0.345 0.650 0.200 
Newness 
Do you think it to be a new risk to you or 
a risk that has each been around for a 
long time? 
(1=old, 5=new) 




How would you rate scientists’ 
knowledge of the risk? 
(1=known precisely, 5=not known 
precisely) 




How would you rate your knowledge of 
the risk? 
(1=known precisely, 5=not known 
precisely) 
0.294 -0.171 0.648 
Total variance explained 
Initial eigenvalue  














Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin KMO and Bartlett's Test 
KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy: 0.692 
Approximate Chi-Square: 325.428 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity, significance: 0.000 
 
  
Table 8. Risk perceptions (threat and uncertainty factors) towards new and old nuclear technologies 
 
Score 
Mean (new nuclear 
technologies) 




Threat Factor 2.33 2.39 -0.06 
Uncertainty 
Factor 
0.90 0.89 0.01 
 
 
Table 9. Existing levels of stakeholder engagement and corresponding levels of satisfaction 
Perceived 
Level of Engagement 
Percentage of Respondents 
Perceived to be at this Level 
Percentage of Respondents 
Satisfied at this Level 
Level 1, Manipulation 0.75% 50% 
Level 2, Therapy 57.09% 11% 
Level 3, Informing 9.51% 27% 
Level 4, Consultation 2.80% 27% 
Level 5, Concession 7.65% 16% 
Level 6, Partnership 11.94% 30% 
Level 7, Delegated power 6.34% 32% 
Level 8, Citizen control 3.92% 38% 
 
 
 
